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Abstract�A complete remote authentication scheme should 
provide the following security properties: (1) mutual authentica-
tion, (2) session key exchange, (3) protection of user anonymity, 
(4) support of immediate revocation capability, (5) low commu-
nication and computation cost, (6) resistance to various kinds of 
attacks, (7) freely choosing and securely changing passwords by 
users, and (8) without storing password or verification tables in 
servers. However, none of the existing schemes meets all the re-
quirements. In this paper, along the line of cost effective ap-
proach using hash functions for authentication, we propose an 
efficient and practical remote user authentication scheme with 
smart cards to support the above complete security properties. 
 
Index Terms�Mutual authentication, revocation, session key 
exchange, smart card, user anonymity 
I. INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of computer networks all over the 
world, a lot of network services are provided by remote serv-
ers. To access these services, traditional remote user authen-
tication is usually a convenient and simple way for the server 
to validate the user’s legitimacy [11]. The smart card is an 
emerging technology that can enhance remote user authentica-
tion. Thus, many researchers have proposed various password 
based authentication schemes using smart cards [2–10, 12, 13, 
17–20]. 
In 2000, Hwang and Li [8] proposed a novel remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards based on the ElGa-
mal public key cryptosystems without storing verification 
tables in servers. Later, Sun [19] proposed an efficient remote 
user authentication scheme based on hash functions. However, 
both Hwang-Li’s and Sun’s schemes do not allow users to 
choose their passwords freely. To cope with this problem, in 
2002, Hwang et al. [7] proposed another cost effective remote 
user authentication scheme using smart cards, allowing users 
freely to select and to change their own passwords. 
The above three authentication schemes are unilateral. 
However, as reported in [1, 14], many Internet frauds oc-
curred in electronic commerce by using smart cards. There-
fore, mutual authentication between server and user to authen-
ticate each other is crucial in secure communication. 
In 2002, Chien et al. [2] proposed a very efficient remote 
mutual authentication scheme with smart cards based on hash 
functions. However, as demonstrated by Hsu [6], Chien et 
al.’s scheme is susceptible to the parallel session attack. In 
2004, Ku and Chen [10] further pointed out that this scheme is 
vulnerable to the reflection attack and the insider attack and 
that it lacks reparability. They then presented improvements 
over these security defects as well as a naive procedure for 
freely changing users’ passwords. Later, Yoon et al. [20] fur-
ther indicated that Ku-Chen’s scheme is still vulnerable to the 
parallel session attack and is insecure in changing passwords. 
They also provided an improved version to get rid of these 
security flaws. However, their scheme is vulnerable to the off-
line password guessing attack in the improved password 
change phase and is inefficient in preventing the parallel 
session attack. 
Once the user has successfully logged into the server, an 
attacker might eavesdrop on the line to intercept subsequent 
transmitted messages. To keep the communication confiden-
tial, in 2004, Juang [9] proposed an authentication scheme to 
provide session key agreement based on symmetric encryp-
tion. However, this scheme is vulnerable to the known-
plaintext attack and the replay attack as indicated by Shieh 
and Wang [18]. Later, in 2006, Liaw et al. [13] also proposed 
a scheme for session key exchange based on modular expo-
nentiation. However, it is vulnerable to the known-plaintext 
attack and the man-in-the-middle attack and is insecure during 
the password change phase, as illustrated by Shieh and Horng 
[17].
For most of the existing authentication schemes, when a 
user wants to login to a server, his identity ID is transmitted in 
plaintext form at each time. An attacker may trace a particular 
user according to the transmitted ID and launch some attack 
actions. Therefore, protecting user’s privacy in networks 
becomes an important issue. In 2004, Das et al. [4] first pre-
sented a dynamic ID-based unilateral authentication scheme 
to protect user anonymity based on hash functions, in which 
the remote server does not know the login user’s real ID. 
Latter, in 2005, Chien and Chen [3] proposed a remote mutual 
authentication scheme to preserve user anonymity based on 
modular exponentiation, where the user’s real ID is known to 
the server. 
To improve the security of the server for handling the lost 
smart card problem, in 2005, Fan et al. [5] proposed a new 
scheme to provide server managers the capability to revoke 
users’ authority immediately based on symmetric encryption. 
Abstract —Cyberactivism refers to the use of the Internet to 
advocate vigorous or intentional actions to bring about social or 
political change. Cyberactivism analysis aims to improve the 
understanding of cyber activists and their online communities. In 
this paper, we present a case study of online Free Tibet activities. 
For web site analysis, we use the inlink and outlink information of 
five selected seed URLs to construct the network of Free Tibet 
web sites. The network shows the close relationships between our 
five seed sites. Ce trality measures reveal that tibet.org is 
probably an information ub site in the network. Further content 
analysis tells us that common hub site words are most popular in 
tibet.org whereas dalailama.com focuses mostly on religious 
words. For forum analysis, descriptive statistics such as the 
number of posts each month and the post distribution of forum 
users illustrate that the two large forums FreeTibetAndYou and 
RFAnews-Tibbs ave experie ced sig ificant reduction in 
activities in recent years and that a small percentage of their users 
contribute the majority of posts. Importa t phrases of several 
long threa s and active forum users are identified by using 
mutual information and TF-IDF scores. Such topical analyses 
help us understand the topics discussed in the f rums and the 
ideas d interest of those forum users. Finally, social network 
analyses of the forum users are conducted to reflect their 
interactions and the social structure of their online communities. 
Index Terms — Cyberactivism, Forum Analysis, Free Tibet, 
Web Site Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION
CTIVISM often refers to vigorous or intentional actions 
that aim to bring about social or political change [1]. The 
rapid evelopment f the Internet makes it n ideal source for 
information and propaganda dissemination [2] [3]. Cyber 
activists use web sites, forums, and other types of c mput r 
media to build relation hips with the public, voice their 
opinions, and spread their propaganda [4] [5]. Consequently, 
Cyberactivism, which refers to activism on the Internet, has 
emerged as a new and important social phenomenon. 
A comprehensive and systematic framework for analysis of 
Cyberactivism needs to be developed for researchers, analysts, 
and related government agents to get a better understanding of 
cyber activists and their online communities. For example, it 
has been observed that web sites of related activism groups are 
linked to each other through hyperlinks, creating their own 
community network [6]. A good research framework would 
include an effective method to identify such networks and the 
roles of the web sites in the networks. In forums, social 
networks of forum users, representative topics and phrases, and 
active users are useful information that can help understand 
member interactions. 
This paper presents a case study of online Free Tibet 
activities and is an initial attempt toward a framework to 
analyze Cyberactivism. Two popular Internet media, web sites 
and forums of Free Tibet activities, are identified, collected, 
and analyzed. We aim to shed light on the following research 
questions:
1. What automated methods can be used to analyze 
Cyberactivi m? 
2. What knowledge and ins ghts can we gain through 
social network and topical analysis of Cyberactivism? 
II. FREE TIBET
Tibet generally refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, a 
province-level entity governed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). Religion is extremely important to the Tibetans 
and Tibet is the traditional center of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lamas and Dalai Lamas are two well-known spiritual 
leaders of Tibetans.
Tibet was first included into China’s territory in the 1300s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet and Mongolia 
signed a treaty proclaimi g mutual recognition and their 
independ nce from the Republic of China.  When the China 
Civil War ended in 1949, Tib t bec me a par  f the PRC. In 
1959, PRC armies thwarted the Tibetan resistance movement 
and Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, fl d to India. 
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also referred to 
as the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGE), is headed by the 
14th Dalai Lama and claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet.  Free Tibet activities refer to activities 
that aim to support the independence of Tibet. Most Free Tibet 
activities are guided by the CTA. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Free Tibet related web sites and forums are the focuses of 
this case study. Such web sites and forums are created and 
maintained by activists, supporters, and sympathizers in a 
variety of languages, incl ding English, Chinese, and Tibetan. 
In this study, we propose ifferent methodologies for analysis 
of each medium. 
A. Web Site Analysis 
1) Identifying and Collecting Important Web Sites 
Since there are many Free Tibet web sites available, the first 
step is to identify which ones are important. Fig. 1 shows our 
identif cati n process. 
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According to the above analysis, a complete and efficient 
remote user authentication scheme with smart cards must have 
the following properties: 
(1) The remote servers do not need to store password or 
verification tables. 
(2) The users can freely choose and change their own 
passwords. 
(3) The scheme must be efficient and practical. 
(4) The scheme must resist various kinds of attacks, such as 
replay attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, modification at-
tacks, insider attacks, offline password guessing attacks, 
reflection attacks, and parallel session attacks. 
(5) The scheme must provide mutual authentication. 
(6) The scheme must provide session key agreement. 
(7) The scheme can protect user anonymity. 
(8) The scheme can support immediate revocation for lost 
smart cards. 
However, none of the existing schemes possesses all the 
above eight security properties. In this paper, along the line of 
cost effective approach using hash functions only as in [2, 7, 
10, 19, 20], we propose a complete and efficient remote user 
authentication scheme to satisfy all the above requirements for 
security properties, without resorting to costly modular expo-
nentiation or symmetric encryption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we propose our authentication scheme. In Section III, we 
analyze the security of the proposed scheme. In Section IV, 
we compare our scheme with other related schemes. Finally, 
we conclude this article in the last section. 
II. PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose a complete and efficient 
authentication scheme with smart cards based on secure one-
way hash functions to meet all the eight requirements 
discussed in Section I. The scheme consists of five different 
phases: the registration phase, the login phase, the verification 
phase, the password change phase, and the revocation phase. 
A. Registration Phase 
Suppose that x and p are two permanent secret keys stored 
in a remote server S, and h(�) is a public secure one-way hash 
function [15], where p is used to provide user anonymity. Let 
n denote the number of times a user U re-registers to S, which 
is stored in the account database DB of S. The registration 
phase proceeds as follows: 
(1) If U wishes to register to S, he/she first selects his 
identity ID and password PW. (If he/she wants to re-
register to S, he/she only needs to select a new password 
PW.) Then, he/she chooses a random number b and 
computes EPW = h(b || PW).
(2) U submits ID and EPW to S via a secure channel. 
(3) If S accepts U’s registration (or re-registration) request, S
performs the following steps: 
(a) If U is a new user to S, set n = 0; otherwise, if U
wants to re-register to S, retrieve n by ID from DB
and increment n by 1. Store (ID, n) to DB.
(b) Compute V = h(x || EID), where EID = (ID || n).
(c) Compute R = V � EPW.
(4) S issues U a smart card containing R and p over a secure 
channel. 
(5) U enters and stores b into his new smart card so that 
he/she does not need to remember b.
Note that as in most of the proposed authentication schemes, 
the smart card is considered as a secure device. In our scheme, 
we assume that the values of R, p, and b stored in the smart 
card cannot be retrieved by any holder of the smart card. 
B. Login (Password) Change Phase 
If U wishes to login to S (or to change his password), 
he/she inserts his smart card into the card reader of a terminal 
and inputs his ID and PW. The smart card performs the 
following steps, as shown in Fig. 1: 
(1) Set O = 1 for the login request (or O = 0 for the 
password change request). 
(2) Compute V = R � EPW, where EPW = h(b || PW). 
(3) Acquire the current timestamp T and generate a random 
number r.
(4) Compute C1 = h(r || O || T || V). Note that C1 is a message 
authentication code (MAC) acting as a challenge 
message to the server S.
(5) Compute an anonymous identity AID = ID � h(p || T || r).
(6) Send the message (AID, T, r, O, C1) to S.
C. Verification Phase 
On the receipt of U’s login (or password change) request 
message (AID, T, r, O, C1), S performs the following steps to 
authenticate U:
(1) Verify the freshness of T. If it fails, reject U’s request 
and stop. 
(2) Compute ID = AID � h(p || T || r) and check the validity 
of ID. If it fails, reject U’s request and stop. 
(3) Retrieve n by ID from DB and compute EID = (ID || n).
(4) Compute V = h(x || EID) and check whether h(r || O || T || 
V) = C1. If they are equal, S believes U is a legal user 
because U has the shared secret V; otherwise, reject U’s 
request and stop. 
(5) Compute C2 = h(C1 || V) and send it to U, where C2 is a 
MAC acting as a response message to C1 for mutual 
authentication. 
(6) If O = 1, then accept U’s login request, compute a 
session key SK = h(C2 || V), and continue the current 
session; otherwise, terminate the communication for the 
password change request. 
Upon receiving the reply message C2 from S, the smart card 
performs the following steps to authenticate S:
(1) Check whether h(C1 || V) = C2. If it fails, give up the 
login (or password change) request. Otherwise, the 
authentication is successful because S contains the MAC 
C1 and the shared secret V.
Authorized licensed use limited to: Tamkang University. Downloaded on March 23,2010 at 23:25:59 EDT from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 
Fig. 1. The login phase, verification phase, and password change phase of the proposed scheme. 
(2) If O = 1, compute a session key SK = h(C2 || V), and 
continue the current session. 
(3) Otherwise, perform the following steps to change pass-
word: 
(a) Ask U to input a new password PW'.
(b) Replace R with V � h(b || PW').
D. Revocation Phase 
If U loses his smart card, the server manager may change 
his n value stored in DB of S to immediately revoke the access 
authority of U to maintain user’s immediate security. In our 
scheme, n is incremented by one. Note that the server 
manager does not need to delete U’s entry from DB. Later, the 
revoked user U may re-register to S without changing his ID.
Though n is stored in DB, S only needs to keep its integrity 
but not its confidentiality. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
1. No password or verification table. In this scheme, only 
the values of x and p are kept secretly in S; there are no 
password or verification tables stored in S. Thus, our 
scheme will not suffer from the stolen-verifier attack and 
the modification attack. 
2. Freely choosing and securely changing passwords. In 
some remote authentication schemes as in [8, 19], strong 
passwords are assigned to users by the server. These 
passwords are usually too long (for example, 1024 bits) to 
remember. In our scheme, users can freely choose their 
own passwords (i.e., weak passwords for easily remem-
bering) during the registration phase. In addition, our 
scheme also provides a secure password change phase 
with the help of the server verification to let users change 
their own passwords at will, unlike the insecure password 
change procedures in [7, 10, 20]. 
3. Efficiency and practicability. The smart card needs only 
five hash operations during the login (or change password) 
phase, verification phase, and session key generation. 
Since the computation cost in the smart card is extremely 
low, the proposed scheme guarantees user efficiency. 
Even in the server, only four hash operations and one 
database retrieval operation are performed. Thus, server 
efficiency is also guaranteed. These low computation 
costs in both the smart card and the server make the 
scheme more practical. 
4. Resistance to the parallel session attack and the 
reflection attack. Parallel session attacks in [2, 10] and 
reflection attacks in [2] are resulted from symmetric 
computations of MACs on both the server and the smart 
card. Since we employ asymmetric computations of 
MACs C1 and C2, our scheme can withstand these two 
kinds of attacks. 
5. Resistance to the replay attack. Because our scheme uses 
timestamp-based approach, the server will check the 
freshness of each login (or password change) request 
message to avoid the replay attack, as does in Ku-Chen’s 
[10] scheme. In addition, our scheme also applies 
challenge/response mechanism to avoid the replay attack. 
That is, C1, created by the smart card, is a fresh challenge 
containing fresh timestamp T and C2 is a response 
containing the fresh C1. A replayed C2 containing an old
C1 will never pass the check performed by the smart card.
6. Resistance to the offline password guessing attack. In the 
login (or change password) request message, C1 = h(r || O
|| T || V) does not contain any password information, but V
= R � EPW = R � h(b || PW) resulting in C1 = h(r || O || T
Server S contains secret keys x, p, and 
an account database DB
contains R, p, and b
Login or password change phase:
Input ID and PW
Set O = 1 for login request or 
O = 0 for password change request 
Acquire current time stamp T
Generate random number r
Compute 
EPW = h(b || PW)
V = R � EPW
C1 = h(r || O || T || V)
AID = ID � h(p || T || r)
Transmit (AID, T, r, O, C1)
(AID, T, r, O, C1)
Verification phase:
Verify freshness of T
Compute ID = AID � h(p || T || r)
Check validity of ID
Retrieve n by ID from DB
Compute 
EID = (ID || n)
V = h(x || EID)
Check if h(r || O || T || V) = C1
Compute C2 = h(C1 || V)
Transmit (C2)
If (O = 1) [for login request] 
Accept U’s login request 
Compute session key 
SK = h(C2 || V)
Continue the session 
Else [for password change request] 
Terminate the communication 
(C2)
Check if h(C1 || V) = C2
If (O = 1) [for login request] 
Compute session key 
SK = h(C2 || V)
Continue the session 
Else [for password change request] 
Enter new password PW'
Replace R with V � h(b || PW')
Smart Card
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|| R � h(b || PW)) may be used to guess password. 
However, R and b are kept secretly inside the smart card 
and cannot be retrieved by any cardholder. Therefore, 
although T and O can be intercepted from the network, 
correct PW in C1 = h(r || O || T || R � h(b || PW)) cannot 
be guessed without knowing R and b. Similarly, correct 
PW cannot be guessed from the reply message C2 = h(C1 || 
V) during the authentication phase. 
7. Resistance to the insider attack. During the registration 
phase, if U’s password PW is revealed to S, the insider of 
S may directly obtain PW and impersonate U to access
U’s other accounts in other servers if U uses the same 
password for the other accounts. This causes the so-called 
insider attack. Even if h(PW) is presented to S, an offline 
password guessing attack might be performed on h(PW)
by an insider of S. Like [10], our scheme asks U to 
present h(b || PW)  instead of h(PW) to S. Since b is only 
known to U, the insider of S cannot launch any offline 
password guessing attack on h(b || PW) to obtain PW
unless he/she knows b.
8. Mutual authentication. In this scheme, mutual authentica-
tion between U and S is achieved by sending MACs C1
and C2. U’s smart card sends C1 as a challenge message 
to S to be authenticated. Since this scheme assumes the 
information stored in the smart card cannot be retrieved, 
nobody can create the correct MAC C1 without knowing
R, b, and PW. If U inputs correct password PW, then C1
contains the correct shared secret V and will pass the 
validation of S because only S and U know V. Thus, S
believes that U is a legal user. Similarly, S sends C2 as a 
response message to U’s smart card for authentication. 
Because C2 contains the shared secret V and the fresh 
challenge C1, it will pass the validation of U’s smart card. 
Thus, U believes S is a legal server. 
9. Session key agreement. This scheme provides a session 
key agreement during the verification phase. A session 
key SK = h(C2 || V) is generated in both S and U. Since C2
contains C1 that in turn contains timestamp T, SK will be 
different for each login session. Because R cannot be 
retrieved and password PW is only known to U, SK will 
not be known by attackers. Thus, the communication 
parties can use it securely to encrypt and decrypt 
subsequent messages. 
10. User anonymity. Each time when U wants to login, our 
scheme will compute an anonymous identity AID = ID �
h(p || T || r) for U. Note that the AID will be different for 
each login (or password change) request since the time-
stamp T (acquired from the terminal) and random number 
r (generated by the smart card itself) are different at each 
request. Since p is a shared secret key, h(p || T || r) works 
as a session key used to hide the user U’s identity ID
during the transmission of the login (or password change) 
request message, and finally ID will be known to S.
Because p is irretrievable from the smart card, there is no 
straight forward way to compute ID from the intercepted 
AID, T, and r from the transmitted message. However, if
Fig. 2. Three kinds of mutual authentication mechanisms. 
an attacker has intercept U’s login request message and 
has stolen U’s smart card, he may use the smart card 
trying to derive U’s ID from AID � (AID* � ID*), where 
ID* is a forged identity provided by the attacker to the 
smart card, and AID* is computed by the smart card and 
can be intercepted by the attacker. This is because AID �
ID = h(p || T || r) = AID* � ID*. Although the timestamp 
T can be provided outside from the attacker to the smart 
card, the random number r cannot be obtained from the 
attacker; it must be generated by the smart card itself. 
Therefore, it is impossible for an attacker to derive ID in 
this way. Thus, user anonymity is protected.
11. Revocation. The value of n is protected in R stored in U’s 
smart card. If U’s smart card is lost or stolen, or 
whenever necessary, the server manager will revoke the 
smart card by incrementing the value of n by one in DB.
Since the revoked smart card contains the old n value, 
using the old smart card will not pass the verification 
phase performed by S.  Of course, U’s account is still 
kept in DB, U can re-register to S to obtain a new smart 
card with a new n value. 
12. Efficient 2-way mutual authentication. For mutual au-
thentication schemes, several messages are transmitted to 
verify the legitimacy of both the user and the server 
before successful login. Fig. 2 illustrates three possible 
mutual authentication schemes. Fig. 2(a) is a 2-way 
mutual authentication; it is usually used in the timestamp-
based approach, because only a pair of challenge/ 
response messages is transmitted. Fig. 2(b) is a 3-way 
authentication; it is usually used in the nonce-based 
approach, since two pairs of challenge/response messages 
are transmitted, in which the second message acts both as 
a response message and as a challenge message. An n-
way authentication, as illustrated in Fig. 2(c), includes 
more messages for session key exchange, in addition to 
challenge/response messages, such as in [12]. It is 
obvious that 2-way mutual authentication schemes are the 
most efficient (fastest) mechanisms in terms of commu-
nication time because only two messages are used for 
authentication. In our scheme, a session key is also 
generated during the efficient 2-way mutual authentica-
tion. 
server user 
server user 
server user :
(a) 2-way 
(b) 3-way 
(c) n-way 
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TABLE I
COMPARISONS OF COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COSTS
Authentication Scheme E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
Our scheme 128 2-way + K 513 2H 2H 5H 
Shieh-Horng (2007) [17] 128 3-way + K 1654 1H 2E + 1S + 2H 2E + 1S + 5H 
Liao et al. (2006) [12] 128 3-way 640 1E + 1H 1E + 3H 1E + 3H 
Liaw et al. (2006) [13] 128 5-way + K 2560 1H 3E + 1S + 1H 3E + 1S + 2H 
Shieh-Wang (2006) [18] 128 2-way + K 512 1H 3H 3H 
Fan et al. (2005) [5] 128 3-way 1536 1S + 1H 4H 1S + 4H 
Chien-Chen (2005) [3] 128 2-way + K 4416 2H 2E + 2S 2E + 2S + 1H 
Juang (2004) [9] 128 2-way + K 832 1H 3S + 1H 3S + 2H 
Das et al. (2004) [4] 128 1-way 448 2H 4H 3H 
Yoon et al. (2004) [20] 128 2-way 512 2H 3H 3H 
Ku-Chen (2004) [10] 128 2-way 512 1H 3H 3H 
Chien et al. (2002) [2] 128 2-way 512 1H 2H 3H 
Hwang et al. (2002) [7] 128 1-way 320 1H 2H 2H 
Sun (2000) [19] 128 1-way 320 1H 1H 2H 
Hwang-Li (2000) [8] 1024 1-way 2240 1E 3E + 1H 3E + 1H 
E1: password length (in bit); E2: method of authentication; E3: communication cost (in bit); E4: computation cost of registration; 
E5: smart card computation cost of authentication; E6: server computation cost of authentication; E: modular exponentiation; 
S: symmetric encryption/decryption; H: hashing operation; K: session key agreement. 
IV. COMPARISONS OF RELATED SECURITY SCHEMES
A. Communication and Computation Costs 
In Table I, we evaluate the efficiency of our two proposed 
schemes and other related schemes in terms of communication 
and computation costs. We assume that the length of the 
prime number p in Hwang-Li’s [8] scheme, Chien-Chen’s [3], 
Liaw et al.’s [13], and Liao et al.’s [12] schemes is 1024 bits 
in order to make the discrete logarithm and factoring 
problems infeasible. We assume that the block size of secure 
symmetric cryptosystems [16] is 128 bits and the output size 
of secure one-way hash function [15] is 128 bits. For compari-
son, we also assume that, without loss of generality, the 
lengths of IDs and freely chosen PWs are 128 bits, and
the sizes of timestamps and random numbers are 64 bits. In 
Hwang-Li’s [8] and Sun’s [19] schemes, user passwords are 
generated, respectively, by discrete logarithm and hash 
function, while in other schemes, passwords are chosen freely 
by users. 
For the method of authentication field (E2), “1-way” stands 
for unilateral authentication, “n-way” (n > 1) for mutual 
authentication, and “K” for additionally providing session key 
agreement during authentication. The communication cost (E3)
of each scheme includes all the transmitted messages for 
authentication (including the login phase, the verification 
phase, and session key agreement if provided). For the 
computation costs of registration (E4), smart card (E5), and 
server (E6), we only consider hash functions, symmetric 
encryptions/decryptions, and exponential operations because 
other operations, such as exclusive-or operations and string 
concatenations, are much cheaper operations. Of these three 
compared operations, the cost of exponential operation is 
much more expensive than that of symmetric encryption/ 
decryption, which in turn is more expensive than that of hash 
function. Note that since some schemes [3, 9, 13, 17, 18] 
provide session key agreements, the computation cost fields 
(E4, E5, and E6) also include operations for generating 
session keys because in some of these schemes, session key 
generation is embedded in the authentication procedure. From 
Table I, it is obviously that our proposed scheme provides 
efficient 2-way authentication with session key agreement and 
the costs of communication and computation both on smart 
card and server are very low as compared to other schemes. 
B. Security Features 
In Table II, we compare our schemes with other related 
authentication schemes according to the following thirteen 
different security features: 
� F1: no password or verification table 
� F2: freely choosing password 
� F3: freely changing password 
� F4: providing mutual authentication 
� F5: providing session key agreement 
� F6: protecting user anonymity 
� F7: lost card revocation capability 
� F8: secure password change phase (for freely changing 
password)
� F9: resistance to offline password guessing attacks 
� F10: resistance to insider attacks (not revealing to the 
administrator of the server) 
� F11: resistance to parallel session attacks (for mutual 
authentication) 
� F12: resistance to reflection attacks (for mutual 
authentication) 
Note that feature F8 (i.e., secure password change phase) 
requires that the password change phase only allow legal 
users to change their passwords and can withstand the offline 
password guessing attack. In this table, Hwang et al. [7], Ku 
and Chen [10], Das et al. [4], and Liaw et al. [13], and Liao et 
al. [12] proposed a naive but insecure password change phase 
because their procedures do not check the legitimacy of the 
cardholder. Therefore, it is impossible for an attacker to make 
sure whether he/she has guessed a correct password offline in 
those schemes. However, for Yoon et al.’s [20] scheme, 
although they checked users’ legitimacy, their scheme is vul- 
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TABLE II 
COMPARISONS OF SECURITY FEATURES
Authentication Scheme F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12
Our scheme � � � � � � � � � � � �
Shieh-Horng (2007) [17] � � � � � � � � � � � �
Liao et al. (2006) [12] � � � � � � � � � � � �
Liaw et al. (2006) [13] � � � � � � � � � � � �
Shieh-Wang (2006) [18] � � � � � � � – � � � �
Fan et al. (2005) [5] � � � � � � � – � � � � 
Chien-Chen (2005) [3] � � � � � � � – � � � �
Juang (2004) [9] � � � � � � � – � � � �
Das et al. (2004) [4] � � � � � � � � � � – –
Yoon et al. (2004) [20] � � � � � � � � � � � �
Ku-Chen (2004) [10] � � � � � � � � � � � �
Chien et al. (2002) [2] � � � � � � � – � � � �
Hwang et al. (2002) [7] � � � � � � � � � � – – 
Sun (2000) [19] � � � � � � � – � � – – 
Hwang-Li (2000) [8] � � � � � � � – � � – – 
�: supported, �: not supported; –: not relevant. 
nerable to offline password guessing attacks. Thus, their 
scheme is insecure in their password change phase. Liao et 
al.’s [12] scheme is also vulnerable to offline password 
guessing attacks. Note that Fan et al.’s [5] claimed that their 
scheme could withstand offline password guessing attacks 
even if the contents of the smart card could be retrieved. 
However, Fan et al.’s scheme is still vulnerable to offline 
password guessing attacks if the contents of the smart card 
can be revealed. From Table II, it is apparently that our 
second scheme satisfies all the security requirements as 
analyzed in Section I. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a complete and efficient 
remote user authentication scheme with smart cards. This 
scheme possess the following properties: (1) no password or 
verification table, (2) freely choosing and changing password, 
(3) low communication and computation cost, (4) providing 
mutual authentication, (5) generating session key, (6) offering 
revocation capability, (7) protecting user’s anonymity, and (8) 
resisting various kinds of attacks, such as the offline password 
guessing attack. One important characteristic of the scheme is 
that it uses hash functions only, without using costly modular 
exponentiations or symmetric encryption/decryption, which 
makes our scheme become efficient and practical. 
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